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REGULATING PUBLIC MONOPOLIES IN FURTHERANCE
OF THE EEC FREE COMPETITION GOAL:
ARTICLE 90 AND THE TWO-STEP APPROACH
DANA L. ROMANIUK*
INTRODUCTION
The Treaty of Rome, establishing the European Economic Com-
munity, has as its principal goal the creation of a common market
within the Community.' This common market is intended to be based
on free market competition.2 However, conflicts with the free compe-
tition regime were created when the Treaty reserved the power over
property ownership systems to the Member States. 3 This power al-
lowed the States to intervene in the economy by developing public
monopolies.4 The most prevalent form of economic intervention
practiced by the States involves the granting of exclusive rights to en-
terprises. These exclusive rights create a conflict between the Com-
munity's goal of a common market driven by free market competition
and the State's goal of promoting its economic policies through inter-
vention in the market.'
To eliminate the economic distortions created by States' grants of
exclusive rights, the Commission5 and the Court of Justice6 have relied
* Third-year law student at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 2.
Article 2 states:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and pro-
gressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote through-
out the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous
and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard
of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.
Id.
2. Aurelio Pappalardo, State Measures and Public Undertakings: Article 90 of the EEC
Treaty Revisited, 12 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 29, 31 (1991).
3. EEC TREATY art. 222. This article states that "[t]his Treaty shall in no way prejudice
the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership." Id. The Member
States are as follows: France, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, Denmark, Ireland,
Greece, Portugal, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium. GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 5-11 (1993).
4. The Member States were provided with the discretion to allow public ownership of
business, nationalization of private enterprises, and the acquiring of shareholdings in private
enterprises. Pappalardo, supra note 2, at 32.
5. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 3, at 57. The Commission is the executive body of the
EEC and is appointed for four-year terms by the Member State governments. Id. The Commis-
sion's duties include: beginning the legislative process through drafting of legislation, forming a
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on Article 90. Article 90 governs the relationship created when Mem-
ber States grant exclusive rights to undertakings. 7 Due to recent eco-
nomic and political pressures, the Commission has utilized Article 90
to eliminate the Member States' power to grant exclusive privileges.
Part I of this Note will examine the Member States' granting of exclu-
sive rights and the Article 90 response.
Debate has surfaced over whether the Commission has the au-
thority under Article 90 to merge the existence and exercise of the
rights into one analysis. Part II of this Note will analyze this debate
and the changing approach of the Court of Justice. Under the current
approach of both the Commission and the Court, the existence of the
exclusive rights (i.e., the State's grant of them) is merged with the
analysis of the undertaking's exercise of those rights under the Treaty.
This approach is very different than one which first examines the
existence of the rights under the applicable Treaty rules, and then ex-
amines the exercise of the rights under separate Treaty rules. By
merging the analysis of the issues, the Court is allowing the Commis-
sion to overstep its regulatory authority and adopt a legislative role.
Further, the States and undertakings are deprived of the procedural
safeguards that are embodied in the infringement proceedings under
the Treaty.
To solve these problems, the Court and the Commission should
follow the two-step approach the Court advocated when first con-
fronted with this issue. Part III of this Note will examine this solution.
Under the two-step approach, the existence of the State's grant of the
legislative program, exercising powers delegated to it by the legislature, and overseeing compli-
ance with the law. Id.
6. The Court of Justice is the judicial body of the EEC. Id. at 69. Judges serve for six
years and Member States name their own judges after consulting with the other States. Id. The
Court hears legal actions brought against the institutions and Member States for noncompliance
with Community law. Id. The Court also issues preliminary rulings interpreting Community law
at the request of Member States' courts. Id
7. Article 90 provides:
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States
grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in
force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Teaty, in particular to those
rules provided for in Article 7 and Articles 85 to 94.
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic in-
terest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the
rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, insofar as the
application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the
particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to
such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community.
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this Article
and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or decisions to Member
States.
EEC TREATY art. 90.
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exclusive right to the undertaking is first analyzed to determine if it
violates the applicable Treaty rules. If the right's existence does not
violate the Treaty, the undertaking's exercise of the right is then ana-
lyzed under different Treaty rules. If, under either step, the right vio-
lates the Treaty, the Commission can bring infringement proceedings
against the State and/or undertaking. The State or undertaking will
then have the benefit of procedural safeguards to which they are enti-
tled under the Treaty. Further, the Commission will not be abusing its
authority by adopting a legislative role.
I. THE GRANTING OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS BY MEMBER STATES
AND THE ARTICLE 90 RESPONSE
The overall goal of the EEC was made apparent through the
drafting of the Treaty. Several articles in the EEC Treaty refer to the
goal of a common market based on free market competition. Article
2 provides for the establishment of a common market through the ap-
proximation of Member States' economic policies.8 Article 3 provides
for a system ensuring that competition is not distorted. 9 Further, the
"four freedoms" provide a basic framework for competition and in-
clude the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.10
The Treaty also contains a section entitled "Rules on Competition.""
The Commission is one of the strongest supporters of the free
market ideology in the Community. 12 Its support is most apparent in
its competition policy. The foundation of its competition policy is
based on the belief that free market competition offers the highest
degree of freedom in economic decisions and the maximum degree of
efficiency.13 The Commission has stated:
[C]ompetition is the best stimulant of economic activity since it
guarantees the widest possible freedom of action to all. An active
competition policy pursued in accordance with the provisions of the
Treaties establishing the Communities makes it easier for the supply
and demand structures continually to adjust to technological devel-
opment. Through the interplay of decentralized decision-making
8. Id. art. 2.
9. Article 3(f) provides that the activities of the Community shall include "the institution
of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted." Id. art. 3(f).
10. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 3, at 628. The four freedoms are contained in Articles 9-
84. EEC TREATY arts. 9-84. The basic goal behind these articles is to eliminate barriers to the
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital within the Community. See id. Several of
these rules will be set out later in the note. See infra notes 41, 42, 214, 224, 226.
11. See EEC TREATY arts. 85-94. Articles 85-90 are rules that apply to undertakings, Arti-
cle 91 governs dumping, and Articles 92-94 govern state aid. Id.




machinery, competition enables enterprises continuously to im-
prove their efficiency, which is the sine qua non for a steady im-
provement in living standards and employment prospects within the
countries of the Community ... [C]ompetition policy is an essential
means for satisfying to a great extent the individual and collective
needs of our society.
14
Although the Community is based on free market competition,
the Member States have a role to play. The Member States' role is to
ensure that competition is not distorted and that the undertakings'
and consumers' economic choices will be driven by competition.
15
Thus, this is how one of the founders of the Community described the
Member States' role:
[A] free market economy is a basic principle of the Treaty of Rome.
Such a liberal economic system.., does not exclude State interven-
tion. On the contrary, it presupposes that the State provides a
framework for the operation of such a system; for only an appropri-
ate framework allows each section of the economy to exercise its
freedom of action, in fact compels it to exercise that freedom.
16
Instead of providing a framework for a free market system, Mem-
ber States have distorted this system by pursuing their own economic
policies. To further these policies, Member States have granted exclu-
sive rights17 to public undertakings to conduct economic activities.
These public undertakings are companies over which the State may
exercise an influence directly or indirectly.'8 Due to this heavy influ-
ence, the State must take responsibility for the companies' actions. 19
These grants of power to public undertakings create risks which can
distort the existence of a common market driven by free market com-
petition.20 The State may pursue general economic objectives which
conflict with the Community's free market objectives. 2 ' State inter-
vention may also affect, directly or indirectly, the most important sec-
tors of the economy.22 Further, as the States have a wide variety of
14. Id. (citing First Report on Competition Policy, Brussels-Luxembourg, 1972, at 11).
15. Id. at 31.
16. Id. (citing WALTER HALLSTEIN, EUROPE IN THE MAKING 110 (1972)).
17. Although the Court has never clearly defined exclusive rights, the rights are assumed to
entail the Member States' reservation of a specific economic activity to one undertaking. Thus,
one undertaking controls the whole economic activity in that area in the Member State. Marc
Van der Woude, Article 90: "Competing for Competence," Competition Law Checklist, 1991 EUR.
L. REV. 60, 61.
18. Id. at 61 n.3 (citing Commission Directive 80/723, art. 90(3), 1980 OJ. (L 195/35), on the
transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings).
19. Id. at 60, 61 n.2 (citing Case C-188-190/88, France v. EC Comm'n, 1982 E.C.R. 2545, 3
C.M.L.R. 144 (1982) (ground 12)).
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legal means to pursue their economic policies, the Community is left
with little control over the State intervention.23
In order to hinder the erosion of free market competition, the
Commission has forged a campaign based on the use of Article 90.
There are several reasons for the Commission's recent concern and
strong campaign. One reason concerns the political pressures sur-
rounding the Community's goal to complete the internal market by
1992.24 Thus, exclusive rights and monopolies can continue to exist
only if they further the goals of the Member States and the Commu-
nity. Also, due to technological breakthroughs, natural monopolies
are no longer justifiable.25 Further, the sectors traditionally granted
exclusive rights and monopolies are in need of funds that cannot be
raised by the State acting as owner of the public enterprise. 26 For
these reasons, the Commission has targeted economic areas which tra-
ditionally were controlled by monopolies and has attempted to liber-
alize them. Some of the key areas are telecommunications, 27 energy,
28
postal services, 29 and radio and television broadcasting.
30
23. Id.
24. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Managing Monopolies: The Role of the State in Controlling
Market Dominance in the European Community, 14 EUR. COMPETON L. REV. 61, 67 (1993).
25. Id. at 67-68. The author gives an example of how satellite and cable have relieved the
problem of shortage of frequencies which justified natural monopolies in the telecommunica-
tions market. Id.
26. Id. at 68. The author discusses the pressure on the State resources and the high level of
tax and international competition, which leads to the reduction of taxes, as factors affecting the
State's ability to raise funds. Id. If the sectors become privately owned, they can rely on private
capital and operate on the financial markets. Id.
27. See, e.g., Case C-202/88, Re Telecommunications Terminals Equipment: France (Italy,
Belgium, Germany and Greece intervening) v. EC Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1223,5 C.M.L.R. 522
(1992) [hereinafter Telecommunications Terminals]; Case C-18/88, Rdgie des Tdlgraphes et des
T6l6phones v. GB-INNO-BM, 1991 E.C.R. 13 (unpublished judgment, unofficial translation)
[hereinafter RTT], cited in Judgments of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice,
Competition Law Checklist, 1991 EUR. L. REv. 89, 92-94 [hereinafter Competition Law Check-
list]. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ftir Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R.
649, 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979) [hereinafter Cassis de Dijon]; Case 311/84, Centre Beige d'9tudes de
Marchd-T6lmarketing (CBEM) SA v. Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de T6ldiffusion SA and
Information Publicitd Benelux SA, 1985 E.C.R. 3261, 2 C.M.L.R. 558 (1986) [hereinafter
Telemarketing]; EC Competition Head Opens Door for Users to Challenge Monopoly Status, EC
ENERGY MONTHLY, Mar. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, ECNews File (discuss-
ing how telecommunications operators could be infringing Article 90 through the abuse of their
monopoly status and the use of profits to acquire overseas telecommunications networks).
28. See, e.g., Commission Decision 28/32, Ijsselcentrale, 1991 O.J. (L 28/32); The "Obscure
Clarity" of Article 90, EC ENERGY MONTHLY, Apr. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library,
ECNews File; EC Delays Legal Action Over Import/Export Monopolies, EC ENERGY MONTHLY,
Aug. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Eurcom Library, ECNews File. These articles discuss the
application of Article 90(1) and (2) in the energy sector.
29. See, e.g., Postal Service Monopoly Cannot Be Justified, THE TiMES (London), July 21,
1993, at 21. This article discusses a recent case in which the Court of Justice held under Article
90(2) that the monopoly was justified as to certain services but other services could be per-
formed by private companies. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 72-73 (citing Case C-48/90,
1994]
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Article 90 is the Commission's main weapon in the elimination of
Member States' interference with free market competition. Article 90
consists of three paragraphs.31 The first paragraph prohibits Member
States from enacting measures that violate rules in the Treaty, espe-
cially the competition rules contained in Article 7 and Articles 85 to
94.32 Thus, Article 90 applies to all Treaty rules, although special em-
phasis is given to the competition rules. This paragraph of the Article
reinforces Article 5, which prohibits Member States from taking any
measure which would hinder the attainment of the Treaty objectives.
33
The second paragraph requires undertakings performing services
of general economic interest or with the character of revenue-produc-
ing monopolies to follow the Treaty rules, especially the competition
rules.34 Paragraph two also contains an exemption from the Treaty
rules for certain of the above undertakings. If the rule's application
will obstruct the performance of an undertaking's tasks, the exemp-
tion applies.3 5 Finally, the third paragraph provides that the Commis-
sion will ensure the Article's application, and if necessary for this end
will issue directives or decisions to Member States.3 6
Article 90 is an internal regulation of the Member States.37 It
prohibits States from enacting measures pertaining to their undertak-
ings that are contrary to other articles of the Treaty.3 8 Thus, Article
90 can only be implicated if the Member States violate another Treaty
rule through the enactment of measures directed at undertakings.
Public undertakings cannot violate Article 90(1) on their own. How-
ever, undertakings' activities are limited by the rules on free circula-
tion and the competition rules. Further, undertakings cannot violate
Article 90(2).39 This paragraph merely reinforces the rule that all un-
Netherlands v. EC Comm'n and Case C-66/90, Konicklyike PTT Nederland v. EC Comm'n
(1992)(not yet published)).
30. See, e.g., Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE v. Dimotiki Etairia
Pliroforissis & Sotirios Kouvelas, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2925 [hereinafter ERT]; Case 155/73, Sacchi v.
Tela Biella, 1974 E.C.R. 409, 2 C.M.L.R. 177 (1974) [hereinafter Sacchi].
31. EEC TREATY art. 90.
32. Id. art. 90(1).
33. Article 5 provides that Member States "shall abstain from any measure which could
jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty." Id. art. 5. See also Pappalardo, supra
note 2, at 34.
34. EEC TREATY art. 90(2).
35. Id.
36. Id. art. 90(3).
37. Id. art. 90(1).
38. Pappalardo, supra note 2, at 34. "A 'measure' is certainly any kind of positive action,
whether general or specific, binding or non-binding." Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 65.
39. EEC TREATY art. 90(2).
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dertakings, including public undertakings, are subject to the Treaty
rules, especially the competition rules.
The Court and the Commission have utilized Article 90(1) when
Member States issue measures directed toward their undertakings
which violate the free circulation or competition rules. The rules on
free circulation provide for the free movement of goods, persons,
services, and capital within the Community.4o The Court has held that
Member States cannot violate the free movement rules41 under Arti-
cle 90(1), unless an exception applies.42 One such exception which the
Court has recognized concerns the States' issuance of restrictive regu-
40. Articles 9-37 provide for the free movement of goods; Articles 48-58 provide for the
free movement of persons and right of establishment; Articles 59-66 provide for the free move-
ment of services; Articles 67-73 provide for the free movement of capital. Id. arts. 9-37, 48-73.
41. The relevant free movement rules are Articles 30, 37(1), and 59. Article 30 states:
"[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall, without
prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between Member States." Id. art. 30.
Article 37 orders the adjustment of state monopolies to eliminate the discrimination which
occurs when Member States favor their own goods, and provides:
1. [m]ember States shall progressively adjust any State monopolies of a commer-
cial character so as to ensure that when the transitional period has ended no discrimina-
tion regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists
between nationals of Member States. The provisions of the Article shall apply to any
body through which a Member State, in law or in fact, either directly or indirectly
supervises, determines or appreciably influences imports or exports between Member
States. These provisions shall likewise apply to monopolies delegated by the State to
others.
Id. art. 37(1). This article only applies to goods and not services. Martin Coleman, European
Competition Law in the Telecommunications and Broadcasting Sectors, 11 EUR. COMPETITION L.
REV. 204, 205 (1990). There was some debate over what the term "adjustment" entailed, as the
term determined the scope of Article 90(1). Pappalardo, supra note 2, at 32 n.24 (citing Aurelio
Pappalardo, Position des Monopoles Publics Par Rapport aux Monopoles Privds, in REGULATING
THE BEHAVIOR OF MONOPOLIES AND DOMINANT UNDERTAKINGS IN COMMUNITY LAW 538, 550
(Van Damme ed., 1977)). If the adjustment of monopolies were construed narrowly, the scope
of Article 90(1) would be greatly reduced. However, if adjustment were construed as to require
overhauls in monopolies, the Commission would have a large amount of power under Article
90(1).
Article 59 provides that restrictions on the free movement of services shall be progressively
abolished, and states:
[w]ithin the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on freedom to pro-
vide services within the Community shall be progressively abolished during the transi-
tional period in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a State of
the Community other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.
EEC TREATY art. 59(1). Thus, individuals should be able to provide services to another in a
different Member State.
42. Article 36 provides:
[tihe provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on
imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public pol-
icy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals, or plants;
the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value;
or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restric-
tions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised




lations. These regulations are needed due to "mandatory require-
ments," i.e., consumer and environmental protection and prevention
of unfair competition.43 The Court has also utilized the Treaty compe-
tition rules in combination with Article 90. The competition rules are
addressed to undertakings whose activities can hinder or distort
competition."
43. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 66-67 n.28 (citing Case 72/83, Campus Oil Ltd. v.
Minister for Indus. & Energy, 1984 E.C.R. 2727, 3 C.M.L.R. 544 (1984); Case 279/80, Strafu-
erfahren gegen Alfred John Webb, 1981 E.C.R. 3305, 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (1982)). These are justifi-
cations of a non-economic nature which are basic tasks of State governments. Id. at 63 (citing
Case 95/81, EC Commission v. Italy, 1982 E.C.R. 2187).
44. Article 85 prohibits agreements or practices by undertakings which affect trade within
the Community and distort competition. EEC TREATY art. 85. Article 85(1) provides:
1. [t]he following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading par-
ties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id. art. 85(1). This article also contains an exception which allows agreements or practices which
further the economic progress of the Community, and provides:
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; which contributes to
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or eco-
nomic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and
which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable
to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of
a substantial part of the products in question.
Id. art. 85(3). Also, Article 86 prohibits an undertaking from abusing its dominant position if
trade within the Community is affected. Article 86 provides:
[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the com-
mon market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading par-
ties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id. art. 86.
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Due to the Commission's strong attack on exclusive rights, the
Member States have begun to question the Commission's power
under Article 90. The States want to restrict the Commission's power
because they want to grant exclusive rights to further their individual
economic policies. The States view the Commission's use of Article
90 as an encroachment on their freedom, instead of analyzing the ben-
efits to the Community as a whole. Thus, scholars45 and Member
States46 have advocated a very narrow view of Article 90, limiting its
scope to that of Article 37. If Article 90 were limited to the scope of
Article 37, the Commission could control the existence of monopolies
covering only the importation and exportation of goods.47 Thus, this
narrow view restricts Article 90's power to prohibiting only monopo-
lies already prohibited under Article 37, involving the exchange of
goods between Member States. Monopolies in goods that remain
within the Member State or monopolies in services and capital will not
be affected by this narrow approach.
Also, under this narrow view, the existence of exclusive rights not
falling under Article 37 is controlled by the free circulation articles
alone, without the use of Article 90.48 The undertaking's exercise of
the rights is controlled only by the competition articles.49 Advocates
of this narrow view justify this approach by arguing that Article 90
presupposes the existence of exclusive rights.50
However, the Commission's view of Article 37 is that the monop-
olies need to be structurally changed so they can no longer engage in
discrimination.51 The Commission argues that Article 37 is not the
only prohibition concerning the granting of exclusive rights. Under
Article 90, all exclusive rights should be abolished unless there is a
45. Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 66. See also Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 68. Van der
Woude discusses his belief that Article 90(1) does not control the existence of exclusive rights,
but only the "assessment of ancillary restraints" which affect competition as a result of the exist-
ence of the rights. Id.
46. See, e.g., Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1229. At issue was a Commis-
sion directive eliminating exclusive rights in the importation, marketing, connection, bringing
into service, and maintenance of telecommunications equipment. Id. France (with Italy,
Belgium, Germany and Greece intervening) argued the Commission lacked competence to elim-
inate exclusive rights for telecommunications equipment in its directive, as Article 90(1) is based
on their lawful existence. Id. France argued the granting of these exclusive rights under Article
37 was also lawful. Id.
47. EEC TREATY art. 37(1).
48. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
49. Id. The competition rules are Articles 85 and 86. See EEC TREATY arts. 85, 86.
50. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
51. Pappalardo, supra note 2, at 33.
1994]
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non-economic public-interest justification.5 2 Thus, the Commission's
approach is to eliminate exclusive rights by using Article 90 unless the
public-interest exception applies.
5 3
The Court of Justice has been called upon to resolve this debate
between the Commission and the Member States. When first con-
fronted with the issue, the Court held that Article 37 did not require
the elimination of state monopolies. However, the Court held that the
Article does prevent the granting of exclusive rights for the import of
goods from other States. 54 Thus, under the Court's approach, the
Commission's power under Article 90(1) was narrowly construed to
prohibit only monopolies for the import of goods.
II. THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 90 BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE
The Court of Justice has played an important role in the Commis-
sion's campaign to limit exclusive rights. At first, the Court set out a
clear test for determining if exclusive rights could exist. Later, as the
cases became more complex, the Court merged issues, leading to con-
fusion. This next section of the Note will detail and analyze the
Court's changing approach.
A. The Court's Distinction Between the "Existence"
and "Exercise" of Monopoly Rights
At first, the Court of Justice distinguished between the existence
and exercise of exclusive rights. The first major case in which the
Court faced this issue was Sacchi v. Tele Biella.5 5 In analyzing the
case, the Court first considered the free circulation rules. The Court
held the existence of a monopoly right for television advertisements
did not by itself violate the rules on the free movement of goods,
56
stating:
Article 90(1) permits Member States inter alia to grant exclusive
rights to undertakings. Nothing in the Treaty prevents Member
52. Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 67 n.17. The author discusses how, under the free move-
ment rules, the Court has indicated in recent judgments, at the Commission's urging, that exclu-
sive rights which are obstacles to these rules can only be upheld if there are non-economic public
interest reasons for the rights. Id.
53. Pappalardo, supra note 2, at 33. The author stated that a structural modification of the
monopolies logically leads to requiring the abolition of the exclusive rights. Id.
54. Case 59/75, Publico Ministero v. Manghera, 1976 E.C.R. 91, 101, 1 C.M.L.R. 557 (1976).
55. 1974 E.C.R. at 426-30. Penal proceedings had been brought against a private television
station and the national court referred questions to the Court of Justice. Id. The case arose after
the Italian Government granted the exclusive right to operate television advertisements to an
undertaking. Id. at 425.
56. Id. at 426. Article 30 was the free movement rule involved. See supra note 41.
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States, for considerations of public interest, of a non-economic na-
ture, from removing radio and television transmissions.... from the
field of competition by conferring one or more establishments an
exclusive right to conduct them. However, for the performance of
their tasks these establishments remain subject to the prohibition
against discrimination and, to the extent that this performance com-
prises activities of an economic nature, fall under the provisions re-
ferred to in Article 90 relating to public undertakings and
undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive
rights.
57
Thus, the Court held that Member States can grant exclusive
rights or monopolies to further the public interest. As the Court up-
held the existence of the rights, it found the monopoly to be in the
public interest. However, the Court held that the undertakings, in ex-
ercising their rights, must comply with the rules against discrimination,
i.e., the free movement articles and the competition rules referred to
in Article 90. If, in exercising its rights, the monopoly were to discrim-
inate in favor of national materials and products, the free movement
of imports would be violated.
5 8
The Court then analyzed the exercise of the rights under the com-
petition articles. The Court held that the granting of exclusive rights,
amounting to a monopoly for the undertaking, was not a violation of
the competition articles 59 or Article 90.60 This result also applied to
an extension of exclusive rights by the undertaking after a new inter-
vention by the Member State.61 If the rights were extended for a non-
economic, public interest reason, Article 90 would not be violated.
However, the Court further held that the undertaking could be in vio-
lation of a competition article if it engaged in discrimination.62 In ad-
dition, the Court held that the national court must determine whether
the undertaking had abused its dominant position.63 If the national
court determined there was an abuse, the Commission would have to
remedy the violation.64
Thus, the Court used a two-step approach in analyzing the grant-
ing and exercise of exclusive rights and monopolies by Member
57. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 428-29.
58. Id.
59. Id. The Court noted if the undertaking imposed unfair charges or conditions on users or
discriminated between national operators and products and other Member States, the undertak-
ing would be in violation of Article 86, abuse of a dominant position. Id.; see EEC TREATY art.
86.
60. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 428-29.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.




States.65 The first step involves analyzing the granting of the exclusive
rights by the Member States. The second step focuses on the exercise
of the exclusive rights by the undertaking. In the first step, the Com-
mission determines whether the existence of the exclusive rights vio-
lates the free circulation rules.66 Exclusive rights are justified if they
are granted for a non-economic, public interest reason.67 Other justi-
fications for exclusive rights are found in exceptions to the free circu-
lation rules.68 Further, the Court of Justice has held that "mandatory
requirements," regulations like consumer and environmental protec-
tion, also justify the granting of exclusive rights or monopolies.
69
If, in the first step, the Commission determines that the monop-
oly is not justified, it can begin infringement proceedings against the
Member State. 70 Under these proceedings, the Court must first give
the State informal notice of the violation and allow a right of reply.
71
If the Commission maintains its view that a violation exists, the Com-
65. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 66-67.
66. Id. at 66. See Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 428, where the Court first analyzes the granting of
the exclusive rights under the free circulation rules to determine if there is a non-economic,
public interest justification. "Nothing in the Treaty prevents Member States, for considerations
of public interest, of a non-economic nature, from removing radio and television transmissions
... from the field of competition by conferring on one or more establishments an exclusive right
to conduct them." Id. at 429.
67. Id.
68. EEC TREATY arts. 36, 48(3), 56(1). For the text of Article 36, see supra note 42. Article
48(3) is located in the free movement of workers provisions and states:
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy,
public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with
the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in
that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in implementing regulations
to be drawn up by the Commission.
Id. art. 48(3).
Article 56(1) is located within the right of establishment and provides:
1. The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not
prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative
action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy,
public security or public health.
Id. art. 56(1)
69. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 63.
70. Id. at 67. Article 169 provides:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil[l] an obligation
under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State
concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the State concerned does not
comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may
bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
EEC TREATY art. 169.
71. 1l
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mission issues a reasoned opinion to the Member State.72 The opinion
must give the Commission's reasons for its view and must also ask the
State to take corrective action within a time period.73 If the Member
State does not comply with the Commission's opinion within that time
period, the Commission can bring the dispute before the Court of
Justice.
74
However, if the Commission determines that the monopoly is jus-
tified under the free circulation rules, it will further examine the exer-
cise of the exclusive rights in the second step of the test.75 The
Commission determines whether the undertaking's exercise of its
rights violates the free circulation and competition rules. 76 If the exer-
cise of the rights violates any Treaty rules, the Commission next deter-
mines if an Article 90(2) exception allows the undertaking to violate
Article 90.77
In order for the Article 90(2) exception to apply, two require-
ments must be fulfilled. First, a public authority must have entrusted
the undertaking with the service of general economic interest.78 Sec-
ond, the application of the Treaty rules must obstruct the undertak-
ing's performance of its task.79 If the exception applies, then the
exclusive rights are justified and the free circulation and competition
rules do not apply to the undertaking.8°
If the exception does not apply, the Commission will find that the
undertaking has violated the free movement or competition rules.
The Commission can then bring enforcement proceedings against the




75. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 68. See Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 428, where the Court
permits the granting of a monopoly or exclusive rights when there is a non-economic, public
interest justification. Then the Court examines the undertaking's exercise of the rights under the
free circulation and discrimination rules, and explains:
for the performance of their tasks these... [public undertakings] remain subject to the
prohibitions against discrimination and, to the extent that this performance comprises
activities of an economic nature, fall under the provisions referred to in Article 90
relating to public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special
or exclusive rights.
Id. at 429.
76. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 68.
77. Id.
78. Leigh Hancher and Piet Jan Slot, Article 90, 11 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 35, 36 n.16
(1990) (citing Case 7-82, Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Leistungsschutzrechten mbH(GVL) v.
EC Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R. 483, 3 C.M.L.R. 645 (1983)).
79. EEC TREATY art. 90(2).
80. Id.
81. Infringement proceedings are brought under Article 169. See supra note 70.
1994]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ercise of the rights, Article 90 does not apply. Article 90 only prohib-
its Member States' measures and is not addressed to undertakings
themselves. 82 Thus, Article 90(1) and (3) do not come into play under
either step of the approach.
In the next two cases, the Court utilized the second phase of the
two-step approach, regulating the exercise of exclusive rights. In Cen-
tre Beige d'Etudes de Marchi-T6l6marketing SA v. Compagnie Lux-
embourgeoise de T6ldiffusion SA, 83 the Court utilized a competition
article to analyze the public undertaking's exercise of its exclusive
right.84 The Court first held that the undertaking was subject to the
competition articles even though the dominant position was created
by law.85
The Court then examined the undertaking's exercise of its domi-
nant position and held that it violated a competition article.86 The
undertaking had expanded its exclusive right, without an objective
reason, into areas where other companies could provide the services. 87
In Sacchi, the Court held that an undertaking's expansion of exclusive
rights after a new intervention by the State did not violate a competi-
tion article in combination with Article 90.88 However, in Centre
Beige, the undertaking had used its dominant position to expand into
an ancillary activity without a new intervention by the State.89 Thus,
undertakings on their own can only expand their exclusive rights into
other areas for non-economic, public policy reasons related to their
original grant of exclusive rights.90 This is the same standard applied
82. EEC TREATY art 90(1).
83. 1985 E.C.R. 3261.
84. Due to treaties and laws, an undertaking had a statutory monopoly in the television
market. Id. at 3272. The undertaking expanded its exclusive right into telemarketing by restrict-
ing access to its advertisements to companies who would use its telemarketing operations. Id.
85. Id. at 3276. The Court referred to Article 86, which deals with the abuse of a dominant
position. Id.; see EEC TREATY art. 86.
86. The competition rule was Article 86. See EEC TREATY art. 86.
87. Telemarketing, 1985 E.C.R. at 3278. The Court held:
an abuse within the meaning of Article 86 is committed where, without any objective
necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position on a particular market reserves
to itself or to an undertaking belonging to the same group an ancillary activity which
might be carried out by another undertaking as part of its activities .... with the possi-
bility of eliminating all competition from such undertaking.
Id.
88. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 429.
89. Telemarketing, 1985 E.C.R. at 3276.
90. Id. at 3278. The Court discussed how the undertaking's refusal to allow telemarketing
activities unless its telephone number was used was not justified by technical or commercial
requirements relating to the nature of television. Id.
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in the Sacchi case to the granting of exclusive rights originally. 91 In
Sacchi, the Court held that Member States can grant exclusive rights
to undertakings for non-economic, public policy reasons.92 Thus, the
standard applied to the State's original grant of exclusive rights to un-
dertakings is the same as the standard applied to undertakings' own
expansion of their exclusive rights.
In Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen & Silver Line Reisebiiro GmbH v.
Zentrale zur Bekdmpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV,9 3 the Court also
analyzed the undertakings' exercise of their exclusive rights under the
competition articles. 94 The Court first held that agreements on airline
tariffs were void under a competition article, unless the undertakings
had been granted an exemption under the article. 95 The Court held
that the undertakings' dominant position could be abused if exces-
sively low or high tariffs were charged. 96
The Court then analyzed the Member State's involvement in en-
couraging the undertakings' violation of the competition rules.97 The
Court held Articles 5(2) and 90 must be read together, as both pro-
hibit State governments from favoring agreements that infringe the
competition articles.98 Thus, States are prohibited from encouraging
undertakings to enter agreements on tariffs or approving of them un-
less there is an exemption under Article 90(2). 99
Thus, the Court held Article 90(1) can be utilized when analyzing
the exercise of the exclusive rights. In Sacchi, the Court did not apply
Article 90.100 But, after Ahmed Saeed, Article 90(1) applies to the
exercise of the rights if the State encourages the undertakings to take
actions in violation of the Treaty.' 0' Thus, the two-step approach was
91. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 429. In Sacchi, the Court held Member States could only grant
exclusive rights to undertakings for non-economic, public policy reasons. Id.
92. Id.
93. Case 66/86, 1989 E.C.R. 838, 4 C.M.L.R. 102 (1989) [hereinafter Ahmed Saeed].
94. The competition articles are Article 85, prohibiting anti-competitive agreements, and
Article 86, prohibiting abuse of a dominant position. See EEC TREATY arts. 85, 86.
95. Ahmed Saeed, 1989 E.C.R. at 846. The airline tariffs were only for flights within the
Community. Id. The competition rule was Article 85(2) and the exception was Article 85(3).
See EEC TREATY arts. 85(2), 85(3).
96. Ahmed Saeed, 1989 E.C.R. at 850.
97. Id. at 851. For relevant competition rules, see supra note 94.
98. Ahmed Saeed, 1989 E.C.R. at 851. Article 5(2) prohibits Member States from enacting
measures which could jeopardize the Treaty objectives. EEC TREATY art. 5(2).
99. Ahmed Saeed, 1989 E.C.R. at 852-53.
100. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 429-30.
101. Ahmed Saeed, 1989 E.C.R. at 853.
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expanded to include Article 90 in analyzing the exercise of the exclu-
sive rights.1°2
Further, the Court set out a process for determining whether an
Article 90(2) exception applies. The Court held that national authori-
ties and courts must first establish if the airline was entrusted with a
service of general economic interest by an act of the public author-
ity.10 3 The national authorities and courts must then determine the
needs of the undertakings and their influence on the airline tariffs.' ° 4
Thus, the Court relinquished some of the Commission's power and
allowed national authorities and courts to determine if an Article
90(2) exception applied. Before this case, the Commission had been
viewed as the only authority allowed to approve Article 90(2)
exceptions. 0 5
B. The Merger of the "Existence" and "Exercise"
of Exclusive Rights Under Article 90
The Court radically changed its approach to analyzing the exist-
ence and exercise of exclusive rights in Re Telecommunications Termi-
nals Equipment: France v. EC Commission.1°6 The Commission
issued a directive under Article 90(3) to liberalize the telecommunica-
tion terminal equipment market. 0 7 The directive prohibited exclusive
rights concerning importation, marketing, connection, bringing into
service, and maintenance rights in the telecommunications equipment
industry.' 0
8
France, joined by several other Member States, challenged the
directive. 0 9 First, France argued that the Commission could not elim-
102. EEC TREATY art. 90(1). The language of Article 90(1) states that it only applies to
measures taken by Member States. See id. It would seem that the mere encouragement of
action by the Member State would not amount to a "measure." However, a "measure" has been
defined as any kind of positive action, whether general or specific, binding or non-binding.
Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 65.
103. Ahmed Saeed, 1989 E.C.R. at 852.
104. Id.
105. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 78.
106. 1991 E.C.R. 1-1223.
107. Id. at 1-1240. The Commission took this action due to technological developments and
the role of information technology in the telecommunications industry. Id. The directive also
prohibited undertakings competing in the telecommunications market from drawing up and
monitoring the application of specifications for the equipment. Id.
108. Id. at 1-1226.
109. Id. at 1-1227. Article 173 provides:
[t]he Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the Commis-
sion other than recommendations or opinions. It shall for this purpose have jurisdic-
tion in actions brought by a Member State, the Council or the Commission on grounds
of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringe-
ment of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.
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inate exclusive rights under Article 90(1), as the Article presupposed
their existence. 110 France argued that the Commission should only
have assessed whether the exercise of the right was within the Treaty
rules."' However, the Commission argued in reply that some exclu-
sive rights cannot be separated from their exercise." 2 Thus, the very
existence of some exclusive rights must be eliminated because the dis-
crimination from the exercise of the rights arises from their actual
existence.
France also argued that the Commission abused its power by
adopting a directive under Article 90(3) instead of bringing an in-
fringement proceeding." 3 The Member State argued that an infringe-
ment proceeding would involve determining case by case if the grant
of exclusive rights results in discrimination. 1 4 However, the Commis-
sion passed general legislation under Article 90 without making a case
by case determination. Thus, France argued that the Commission as-
sumed a legislative role and encroached on the Council's authority."
5
Any natural or legal person, may under the same conditions, institute proceedings
against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the
form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individ-
ual concern to the former. The proceedings provided for in this Article shall be insti-
tuted within two months of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to the
plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the
latter, as the case may be.
EEC TREATY art. 173. Article 174 provides:
[i]f the action is well founded, the Court of Justice shall declare the act concerned to be
void. In the case of a regulation, however, the Court of Justice shall, if it considers this
necessary, state which of the effects of the regulation which it has declared void shall be
considered as definitive.
Id. art. 174.
110. Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1229. This covered the exclusive im-
porting and marketing rights. Id.
111. Id. France argued Article 37 was the only restraint on the existence (i.e., the granting)
of exclusive rights. ld. France further argued that Article 37 did not apply to the exclusive rights
of connection, service and maintenance, as the transmission of messages is a service and does not
involve goods. Id.; see EEC TREATY art. 37. As Article 37 does not apply here, the existence of
the rights cannot be prohibited under Article 90. Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at
1-1229; see EEC TREATY art. 90. Therefore, only the exercise of the rights can be evaluated
under Article 90.
112. Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1223.
113. Id. at 1-1230. Infringement proceedings are brought under Article 169. See EEC
TREATY art. 169.
114. Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1229.
115. Id. Under Article 100a(1), the Council is delegated the power to legislate. Article
100a(1) provides:
1. [b]y way of derogation from Article 100 and save where otherwise provided in this
Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set
out in Article 8a. The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from
the Commission in cooperation with the European Parliament and after consulting the
Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the pro-
visions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
1994]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
The Commission replied that the purpose of the directive was
regulatory and was thus within its authority.11 6 The directive's pur-
pose was to set out the States' obligations, remedy infringements and
prevent future infringements. 1 7 Thus, the Commission argued that
the directive took account of the telecommunications structure in the
States and adopted measures allowing the States to comply with the
Treaty."1
8
The Court upheld the Commission's authority to issue the direc-
tive.119 Under Article 90(3), the Commission can specify in general
terms the States' obligations under Article 90(1) by issuing direc-
tives.120 However, this authority is not extended to determining
whether a State has fulfilled its obligations.' 21 The Court also stated
that the directive set out the States' obligations in relation to the tele-
EEC TREATY art. 100a(1). Article 145 also addresses the Council's power to legislate, providing:
To ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty are attained, the Council shall, in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty:
-ensure coordination of the general economic policies of the Member States;
-have power to take decisions;
-confer on the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the
implementation of the rules which the Council lays down.
The Council may impose certain requirements in respect of the exercise of these pow-
ers. The Council may also reserve the right, in specific cases, to exercise directly imple-
menting powers itself. The procedures referred to above must be consonant with
principles and rules to be laid down in advance by the Council, acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the Opinion of the European
Parliament.
ld. art. 145.
Sir Guiseppe Tesauro, the Advocate General, also questioned the Commission's authority
to eliminate exclusive rights. See Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1253-58. Te-
sauro argued the Commission took a legislative role, outside its competence, by issuing general
rules that reguided the direction of the broadcasting sector. Id. at 1-1254. Sir Tesauro stated that
the telecommunications sector should be regulated on a perceptive basis, requiring the Commis-
sion to propose legislation to the Council and the latter finalizing it after the Parliament contrib-
utes its opinion. Id. at 1-1258.
The Advocate General compared the Commission's authority under Article 90(3) with the
Council's authority under Article 94 and argued that the Commission is only authorized to issue
directives and decisions if they are necessary for the performance of its supervisory duty. Id. at I-
1256. However, under Article 94, the Council has authority to adopt all appropriate measures.
Id. Thus, the Commission's directive was a legislative measure outside of its competence, as it
was not necessary for the performance of its duty. Id. at 1-1256-57; see EEC TREATY art. 90(3).
Article 94 provides:
The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission,
make any appropriate regulations for the application of Articles 92 and 93 and may in
particular determine the conditions in which Article 93(3) shall apply and the catego-
ries of aid exempted from this procedure.
EEC TREATY art. 94.
116. Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1234.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1-1238.




PUBLIC MONOPOLIES IN THE EEC
communications equipment sector. 122 This was not an infringement
proceeding.123 The difference between the Council's legislative au-
thority and the Commission's regulatory authority was also explained
by the Court. 124 The opinion further held that Article 90(3) could be
used where necessary to carry out the Commission's supervisory
duty.1
25
The validity of the Commission's directive was then analyzed by
the Court. First, it was noted that the free movement rules apply te all
trading rules which could affect trade within the Community.126 The
Court acknowledged that exclusive importing and marketing rights
deprived traders of the opportunity to sell their products.127 Further,
because the telecommunications sector was so diverse, there was a
lack of certainty that the undertaking could provide all the models
available. 128 Thus, the rights were capable of hindering trade in the
Community, as consumers' equipment choices would be restricted to
what was provided by the undertakings. The Court concluded that the
Commission was justified in eliminating the exclusive rights based on
a free movement rule in connection with Article 90.129
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. The difference between the Council's legislative duties under Article 100a and the
Commission's regulatory duties under Article 90(3) was explained in the Court's opinion, Id. at
1-1265-66. Under the former, the Council can adopt measures to further the approximation of
the Member States' laws dealing with the internal market. Id. However, under Article 90 the
Commission is only authorized to regulate Member States' measures pertaining to their under-
takings. Id.
125. Id. The Court concluded that the Commission's power under Article 90(3) is more
specific than the Council's power under Article 100a. Id.
126. Id. at 1-1267. The Court stated Article 30 applies to all rules having any affect on trade
within the Community, direct or indirect, actual or potential. Id. Article 30 is the rule on the
free movement of imports. See EEC TREATY art. 30.
127. Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1268.
128. Id. Further, the Court held that the elimination of the exclusive importing and market-
ing rights was also justified as competitors must be able to connect, bring into service, and main-
tain equipment. Id. at 1-1269. The Court also noted when issuing the directive that the
Commission took into account requirements which would qualify the undertakings involved for
an Article 90(2) exception. Id. at 1-1263. Thus, Article 90(2) could not be relied on by the
undertakings involved. Id.
129. Id. The Court noted that the public undertaking could not guarantee the reliability of
services for every type of equipment. Id. Thus, consumers' choices were again restricted. The
Court also noted when the exclusive importing and marketing rights were eliminated that an
economic agent must be able to connect, service and maintain equipment. Id. The Court held
that the directive's requirement that an independent entity draw-up and apply technical specifi-
cations to the equipment was justified. Id. at 1-1271. The Court found the possibility of abuse
was so great that it was inconsistent with a fair competition system. Id. Article 30, providing for




By eliminating the exclusive rights of these undertakings by the
use of Article 90 in connection with a free circulation article, the
Court abandoned the distinction between the existence and the exer-
cise of the rights. Before, the rights' existence was evaluated under
the free circulation articles alone. The exercise of the rights was then
evaluated under the competition and free circulation articles. Article
90 was also utilized if the Member State encouraged the undertaking
to violate the competition rules. If the Court ordered the Commission
to follow the two-step approach in evaluating both aspects of the
rights, Article 90 would not have been used with the free import
rule.130 The elimination of the exclusive rights and the outcome of
this case could have been decided under the free import rule alone.' 3'
Under the Telecommunications approach, the Commission can
combine the two-step process into one step by evaluating the exist-
ence and exercise of exclusive rights under Article 90. Under Article
90(3), the Commission can issue directives to all Member States
describing their Treaty obligations. 32 These directives can also guide
States in deciding what actions to take to ensure that their conduct
meets the obligations. 33 Then, if a State does not comply with the
directive, the Commission can bring an infringement proceeding. 34
Thus, the procedure is the same as if the Commission had brought an
infringement proceeding against the State for a violation of the free
circulation rules. 135
There is a different outcome, however, if the State complies with
the directive. The Member State is then deprived of the procedural
safeguards ensured in an infringement proceeding. 36 Under an in-
130. The rule on the free movement of imports is Article 30. See EEC TREATY art. 30.
131. The Court could have followed the two-step approach and analyzed the exclusive rights
under Article 30 alone, as the Court did in Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 429. It also appears that the
Court could have utilized Article 37, as the exclusive rights pertained to the importing and mar-
keting of goods. EEC TREATY art. 37. Thus, the Commission could have brought enforcement
proceedings under Article 169 against France for the violation of Articles 30 and 37. See id. art
169. Then the Court would not have to reach the second part of the two-step test by utilizing
Article 90. Id. art. 90. Article 90 would only be used if France adopted a measure which led the
undertaking to violate the Treaty rules through the exercise of its exclusive rights.
132. Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1264.
133. Id.
134. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 70 n.37 (citing Case 118/45, EC Commission v. Italian
Republic, 1987 E.C.R. 2599, 3 C.M.L.R. 255 (1987); Case 226/87, EC Commission v. Hellenic
Republic, 1988 E.C.R. 3611, 3 C.M.L.R. 569 (1987)). Infringement proceedings are brought
under Article 169. See EEC TREATY art. 169.
135. Id.
136. Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1249. Mr. Advocate General Tesauro
argues Article 90(3) does not expressly provide any procedural safeguards, in contrast to Article
169, which provides for and governs infringement proceedings. id.; EEC TREATY arts. 90(3),
169.
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fringement proceeding, the State has a right to reply before the Com-
mission makes a formal decision. 137 However, under Article 90(3),
the Commission can issue a directive and then directly bring enforce-
ment proceedings against the States not in compliance. This occurs
because the directive takes effect as soon as the Member States are
notified. 138 States and undertakings do not have the opportunity to be
heard before the Commission's formal issuance of a directive. Thus,
the State and undertaking are deprived of an early opportunity to ar-
gue the application of the 90(2) exception, due to mandatory require-
ments or express Treaty exceptions.
Further, an infringement procedure requires the Commission to
state the reasons for its action. 139 If the Commission's reasons are
insufficient, the State can challenge the proceeding in the Court.'
40
However, under Article 90(3), the Commission does not have to state
reasons for the directive. The directive only defines the States' obliga-
tions under the Treaty.141
Even under an Article 90 proceeding, it can be argued that the
State governments have the opportunity to be heard through their
Commission delegates.' 42 Their delegates in the Commission can pro-
tect the States' interests. If the States do not agree with their dele-
gates' views, the State governments can appoint new delegates.
However, Commission members are required to act independently of
their host States.' 43 In addition, the members will advance agendas
that are in the best interests of the Community, not their States.
Further, under an infringement proceeding, the Commission does
not have the final authority to determine that an infringement has oc-
curred. 144 The Commission can only issue a reasoned opinion if it be-
lieves that a Treaty rule has been infringed. 145 If the Member State
does not comply with the Commission's opinion, the case comes
before the Court.' 46 Then, the Court determines if an infringement
137. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
138. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 3, at 75.
139. Id. at 293.
140. Id.
141. Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1264.
142. BERMANN ET. AL., supra note 3, at 57. The author explains how members of the Com-
mission are appointed for four-year renewable terms by the Member State governments acting
in common accord. Id. The five largest states nominate two members each and the smaller
states nominate one each, for a total of 17. Id.
143. Id. at 57 n.2.





has occurred through interpreting the Treaty and precedent. 147 Thus,
the Commission lacks the final authority to determine that an in-
fringement has occurred and must defer to the Court's judgment.
Under the Article 90(3) procedure, however, the Commission has
more power. Under Article 90(3)'s authority, the Commission can is-
sue a directive or decision that is binding on the Member State.148
The directive is the Commission's view of the State's Article 90 obli-
gations, and a decision is the Commission's idea of what constitutes an
Article 90(1) violation. Thus, the Commission's definition of an in-
fringement is not limited to the Court's view, as it is under an infringe-
ment proceeding. Therefore, the Commission can actually legislate
under its Article 90 approach. This is an abuse of its regulatory
authority.
The two-step approach is also preferable because it furthers the
Community's free competition goal. First, the free circulation articles
are applied to the Member State's granting of the rights.149 One pur-
pose of the free circulation rules is to ensure that the free flow of
goods, services, capital and persons is not impeded by State-created
obstacles. 50 Thus, if the granting of the exclusive rights creates obsta-
cles to free circulation, the rights must be struck down. Next, the
competition rules are applied to the exercise of the rights.' 51 The
main purpose of these rules is to ensure that undertakings do not hin-
der competition through their practices. 52 If an undertaking's exer-
cise of the right violates the competition rules, the undertaking must
cease the violation or relinquish the right. Article 90 is not needed in
either situation.
When Article 90 is used in place of the two-step approach, the
Commission enacts a directive eliminating exclusive rights in a partic-
ular sector. This method lacks the two-part analysis which first applies
the free circulation articles and next applies the competition rules.
The Treaty founders set forth these rules as protections to ensure that
the free competition goal is upheld. 53 When the Commission enacts a
general directive in areas where it believes competition is harmed, it
147. Id.
148. Id- art. 90(3).
149. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
150. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 3, at 317.
151. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
152. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 3, at 628.
153. Id. Bermann also notes that the Treaty provides additional means for carrying out com-
petition policy: Article 90 subjects public undertakings to the competition rules; Articles 92-94
govern state subsidies; and other articles impose further obligations on Member States. Id.
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uses its own method for upholding the free competition goal. The
Commission ignores the Treaty protections and chooses instead to rely
on Article 90, as Article 90 allows the Commission great power to
further its ends. As will be discussed below, there is one situation
where Article 90 can be utilized in connection with the free competi-
tion goal.
C. The Court's Utilization of the Competition Rules in the
"Automatic Abuse" Test
The Court next turned to an approach that analyzed the existence
of exclusive rights using the competition articles together with Article
90. This approach contrasts with previous ones where the existence of
the rights was examined through the free circulation articles alone or
in combination with Article 90. The first case in which the Court im-
plemented this new approach was Hdfner & Elser v. Macrotron
GmbH.154 The Court held that the granting of a dominant position
violated a competition article and 90(1).155 The public monopoly
could not satisfy the demand for executive services and the private
companies were prohibited by law from providing them.156 Thus, the
grant of the right violated Article 90(1) because the undertaking could
not exercise the right without infringing a competition article.'5 7
In Hofner, the Court could not analyze the monopoly's existence
under the free circulation articles, as the facts were national. 58 The
free circulation articles do not apply to activities conducted entirely
within the State.' 59 However, the competition articles can be applied
154. Case C-41/90, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1979, 4 C.M.L.R. 306 (1993) [hereinafter Hifner]. The
German government had created a public monopoly for the provision of employment services.
Id. at 1-2012. Several private undertakings entered the market by providing executive recruit-
ment services. Id In reaction to private undertakings entering the market, the public monopoly
issued a circular which demonstrated its willingness to allow private undertakings to engage in
executive recruitment. Id. at 1-2013. However, a private undertaking tried to enforce an execu-
tive recruitment contract in the German courts and the court believed the contract could not be
enforced because it infringed on the public monopoly of employment services. l The national
court referred the case to the Court of Justice. Id.
155. Id. at 1-2019. The competition article was 86(b) dealing with the abuse of a dominant
position through "limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of con-
sumers." EEC TREATY art. 86(b).
156. Hofner, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2019. The Court also analyzed the Article 90(2) exception and
concluded that, because the monopoly could not satisfy the demand and had tolerated private
services, the application of Article 86 to the monopoly would not obstruct the performance of its
tasks. Id. at 1-2017; see EEC TREATY arts. 86, 90(2).
157. The competition article was Article 86 (abuse of a dominant position). See EEC
TREATY art. 86.
158. Hofner, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2020.
159. Id Thus, the Court could not analyze the existence of the exclusive rights under Article
59 (free movement of services). See EEC TREATY art. 59.
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to these internal activities. 16° Thus, under the two-step approach, the
Commission could not apply the first step, involving the free circula-
tion articles. Only the exercise of the right, not the existence, could be
evaluated under this approach. The grant of the right by the Member
State could not be reached but it was the grant that created the prob-
lem. Thus, the Court had to utilize the competition articles. 161
This new approach has become known as the "automatic abuse"
test. 62 The automatic abuse test is used when the State's grant of a
monopoly or exclusive right causes the undertaking to violate a com-
petition rule. The Member State is held in violation of Article 90(1)
and the undertaking in violation of the competition rule. The first
step of the two-step approach is eliminated and the existence and ex-
ercise of exclusive rights are analyzed under Article 90.
The Court continued to utilize the automatic abuse test in Elliniki
Radiophonia Tileorassi AE v. Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis & Sotirios
Kouvelas ("ERT").163 However, the Court also utilized the free com-
petition articles. 64 The Court, quoting Sacchi, held that the grant of a
monopoly for a non-economic public interest reason was not prohib-
ited.165 However, the rules on free circulation and competition must
be followed in the monopoly's organization and exercise. 66 The
Court held that a free movement rule would be violated if a monopoly
had broadcasting and retransmission rights and then discriminated
against other States' broadcasts. 67
Next, the Court analyzed the existence of the exclusive rights
under the competition rules. The Court held that Article 90(1) pro-
hibits the grant of these rights where the undertaking would be led to
160. Hofner, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2015.
161. Id. at 1-2019.
162. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 74.
163. 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2925.
164. Id. This case involved the grant of an exclusive retransmitting right to a company al-
ready granted an exclusive broadcasting right. Id. at 1-2953.
165. Id. at 1-2957.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1-2959. The free movement of services rule is Article 59. See EEC TREATY art.
59. The Court also held that Article 30 was not violated as long as the exercise of the rights did
not involve discrimination. ERT, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2958; see EEC TREATY art. 30. The Court
also recognized that there might be public interest reasons under Article 56 to justify the dis-
criminatory effects of the exclusive rights to broadcast and retransmit other Member States'
broadcasts. ERT, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2960. However, the Court held that the sole objective of the
granting of the exclusive rights was to avoid disturbances due to the limited channels. Id. The
Court found that this was not a legitimate objective under Article 56 because the undertaking
utilized a small number of the available channels. IL The Court held that the national court
would have to determine if Article 30 or Article 59 had been violated and whether there was a
legitimate justification under Article 56. Id.
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violate a competition article.16 Unless the competition article would
obstruct the undertaking's performance of its task, constituting an Ar-
ticle 90(2) exception, the exclusive rights were prohibited. 169 Further,
the Court expressly authorized the national judge to determine
whether the undertaking's practices could be justified under Article
90(2).170
Again, the Court abandoned its two-step approach in examining
the existence of exclusive rights by relying on Article 90 instead of the
free circulation articles. In Telecommunications Terminals, the Court
examined the existence of the exclusive rights under an approach
which merged the free circulation articles and Article 90.171 In con-
trast, the Court in ERT examined the existence of the rights under an
approach which merged a competition article with Article 90.172
The Court could have eliminated the exclusive rights by relying
merely on the free circulation articles, and not Article 90. The grant
of the exclusive rights violated the free circulation articles.173 The vio-
lation could have occurred under a theory that the exclusive rights
created a possibility of discrimination.174 While the application of the
competition articles requires a market analysis, the free circulation
168. Id. at 1-2962. The competition article was Article 86, abuse of a dominant position. See
EEC TREATY art. 86. This article would be violated if the rights led the undertaking to engage
in discrimination against other States' broadcasts. ERT, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2962.
169. ERT, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2962.
170. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 78. Although the Court held in Sacchi that national
authorities and courts could determine that the competition rules do not apply to undertakings,
1974 E.C.R. at 429, the Court in ERT expressly entrusted the national judge with this authority.
See ERT, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2962; see also Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 78. Under this
approach, the national judge could find the Article 90(2) exception applies after the Court found
the Article 56 exception did not apply. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 75-76. This raises the
question of what the relationship would be between the Court's denying an Article 56 exception
but, then the national court allowing an Article 90(2) exception. Id.; see EEC TREATY arts. 56,
90(2).
171. Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1267-70.
172. ERT, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2962. Under this approach, the Court eliminates the need to
examine the exclusive rights twice for justifications. If the Court were first to analyze the exist-
ence of the rights under the free circulation rules, the Court would determine whether the rights
are justified under one of the public interest exceptions or mandatory requirements. Then, if the
rights were justified, the Court would determine if there was an Article 90(2) exemption, al-
lowing the undertaking's deviation from the rules in the exercise of its right. The automatic
abuse test eliminates the need to analyze the existence of the exclusive rights by relying on the
competition rules in connection with Article 90. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 75.
173. The Court could have relied on Articles 30 and 59. Article 30 prohibits restrictions on
the imports of goods and Article 59 prohibits restrictions on the free movement of services.
EEC TREATY arts. 30, 59.
174. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. In Telecommunications Terminals, the Court
held that, because of the possibility of abuse, the Commission was justified in dividing the regu-
latory and operating functions of the undertakings. 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1271.
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rules do not.175 Thus, under the free circulation rules, only a possibil-
ity of discrimination affecting trade between States must be shown.
176
However, under the competition rules, the undertaking's practices
must be shown to actually affect competition negatively. 77
Although in ERT the Court expressly entrusted the national
judge with the power to determine if an Article 90(2) exception ap-
plies, the power is insubstantial. The Commission still has the power
to question the judge's decision if it believes an exception is not justi-
fied.178 Although consumers and private undertakings can challenge
the exclusive rights before a national court,179 the court might refer
questions about Article 90(2)'s application to the Court of Justice.
This would occur if the national court is unsure of how to apply the
Article 90(2) exception and wants direction from the Court of Jus-
tice.18° Thus, the national court's authority to apply the exception is
not vast, as the Commission or the Court will often make the final
decision.
The automatic abuse test was also utilized by the Court in Rggie
des T6l6graphes et des T6l6phones v. GB-INNO-BM SA ("RTT").
181
175. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 75.
176. EEC TREATY arts. 30, 37, 59.
177. Id. arts. 85, 86.
178. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 79.
179. Id. The private undertakings challenging the exclusive rights will often be in competi-
tion with the public undertaking. Id. at 80.
180. The national court can ask the Court of Justice to give a preliminary ruling on the appli-
cation of the Article 90(2) exception. Article 177 provides:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council,
where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that
court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to
enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where
any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member
State, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court
or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
EEC TREATY art. 177.
181. Competition Law Checklist, supra note 27, at 92-94. The Belgian government had
granted a telecommunications network monopoly, RTI'. Id. at 92. Telephone connections to the
network could only be obtained after authorization by RTT. Id. at 93. Thus, all telephones
connected to the network had to be provided by RTT or approved by it. Id. To carry out its
exclusive rights, RTT was authorized to draw up equipment requirements and to determine if
third party equipment met the requirements. Luc Gyselen, Comment, 29 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 1229, 1229 n.2 (1992). Thus, RTT could prevent third parties from selling equipment to be
connected to the network by determining that third party equipment did not meet its require-
ments or setting the requirements so that third parties could not meet them efficiently. Id. RTT
had also extended its monopoly to the right to import, service, commercialize and maintain tele-
phone equipment. Competition Law Checklist, supra note 27, at 93.
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The Court began its opinion by stating that the monopoly provided a
service of "general economic interest" under Article 90(2).182 How-
ever, the Court rejected an Article 90(2) exception, as the production
and sale of telephones must be available to all undertakings. 183 The
Court then analyzed RTT's extension of its exclusive right. The Court
held that RTT had violated a competition article by extending its ex-
clusive right to another market without an objective reason.184
The Court then discussed why Article 90(1) would nct apply in
connection with RTT's violation of the competition article.' 8 5 The
competition articles apply to undertakings which engage in anticom-
petitive behavior on their own.186 However, Article 90(1) applies
when Member State measures are involved.'8 7 Thus, if RTT's exten-
sion of its exclusive rights resulted from a State measure, i.e., the
granting of the rights, Belgium would be in violation of Article
90(1).188 In this case, RTT had extended its monopoly on its own initi-
ative, rather than by a measure issued by Belgium.
The Court held Belgium had violated Article 90(1) and a compe-
tition article when it granted RTT the power to determine standards
and verify competitors' compliance with them.1 9 The Court noted
the need to protect essential requirements like user and employee
safety, and protection of the network. 19 However, the Court also
stated that these requirements could be satisfied by an independent
entity that formulates and applies technical standards.191
The Court also briefly mentioned a violation of the article con-
cerning the free movement of imports. 192 RT'IT had the authority to
approve telephones connected to its network but which were not sup-
plied by it without being subject to judicial review.193 Further, the
Court applied Article 30, a free circulation rule, without proof of dis-
182. Competition Law Checklist, supra note 27, at 93.
183. Id. at 94.
184. Id. at 93. The right was extended to the market for telephone equipment to be con-
nected to the network and included import, service, commercialization, and maintenance rights.
Id. The competition article was Article 86 (abuse of a dominant position). See EEC TREATY
art. 86.







192. See id at 93 n.66. Article 30 is the rule on the free movement of imports. See EEC
TREATY art. 30.
193. Gyselen, supra note 181, at 1233.
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criminatory behavior. There was no proof RTT had engaged in dis-
crimination. 194 This reinforces the argument made earlier that in the
ERT case, the Court could have utilized the free circulation rules
alone to eliminate the exclusive rights.195 As in ERT, the Court could
have relied on the theory that a possibility of discrimination existed
without actual proof of discrimination. 196 The Court could then use
the first step of the two-step approach and eliminate the exclusive
rights through the free circulation rules alone.
197
The two-step approach is preferable to Article 90, because as dis-
cussed earlier, it provides procedural protections and furthers the
Community's free competition goal.' 98 Under the two-step approach,
if a Treaty violation is found, the Commission must bring infringement
proceedings against the undertaking or Member State.199 The in-
fringement proceeding offers procedural protections that are lacking
when the Commission eliminates exclusive rights through Article
90(3).200 The two-step approach also furthers the free competition
goal by analyzing the existence of the exclusive rights under the free
circulation rules and then examining the exercise of the rights under
the competition and free circulation rules.201 This approach complies
with the Treaty's framework for dealing with exclusive rights.
202
In RTT, the Court applied the automatic abuse test, as the grant
of the exclusive right led RTT to abuse its dominant position. 20 3 How-
ever, the Court could have analyzed RTT's power to set the technical
norms under the free import rule, as it was a potential restriction of
trade in goods. 2°4 Upon striking down the exclusive rights under a
free circulation article, the Court would not have to apply a competi-
194. Id. at 1241. However, later in the opinion, the Court changed its solution. Id. RTT
would retain its exclusive approval right, but its decisions would be subject to judicial review. Id.
The Court relied on the free movement of imports rule, Article 30, for this solution by describing
the danger of RTT discriminating against imported equipment. Id.; see EEC TREATY art. 30.
195. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See supra notes 136-53 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 70, 81 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
202. Id.
203. Competition Law Checklist, supra note 27, at 94.
204. The Court alluded to this when it relied on the free import rule for its alternative solu-
tion. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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tion article along with Article 90 to the undertaking's exercise of the
right.20 5
In RTT, the Court's justifications for an Article 90(2) exception
are the same as the Court's past justifications for exceptions to the
free circulation articles.2°6 Thus, Article 90(2) covers all the non-eco-
nomic interests advanced in the Sacchi case justifying the existence of
monopolies under the free circulation articles. 20 7 Therefore, Article
90(2) is the new standard for determining if the existence of exclusive
rights is justified, as the same justifications are utilized as under the
free circulation rules.208 If exclusive rights are not covered under the
Article 90(2) exception, the rights must infringe a competition article
and Article 90 under the automatic abuse test,2°9 or must violate the
free circulation rules.210 Either way, the exclusive rights must be
eliminated.
In Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova SpA v. Siderurgica
Gabrielli SpA, 211 the Court further refined its use of the automatic
abuse test, involving the competition articles and Article 90.212 First,
the Court examined the undertaking's behavior to determine if it had
violated Treaty rules. The Court held that the company had violated a
competition article by abusing its dominant position, which was docu-
205. Article 30 is the free circulation rule that could have been used. See EEC TREATY art.
30. The competition articles are Article 85, prohibiting anti-competitive agreements, and Article
86, prohibiting abuse of a dominant position. Id. arts. 85, 86.
206. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 77. If the rights do not fall under the Article 90(2)
exception, the rights are not covered under the exceptions to the free circulation rules. Id.
207. Sacchi, 1974 E.C.R. at 429.
208. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 77.
209. Id.
210. Id. I would argue that the Commission should first analyze the exclusive rights under
the free circulation rules and the exceptions to the rules. This is where the non-economic public
interests should come into play. If there are justifications for the exclusive rights, then the rights
may exist. Thus, under this approach, the Commission would not have to analyze the existence
of the exclusive rights under Article 90(1) and look for exceptions under Article 90(2). I would
argue that Article 90 should only be utilized when a Member State and undertaking have vio-
lated Article 90(1) and a competition article under the automatic abuse test, when the facts are
national and the free circulation articles cannot be utilized.
211. Case C-192/90 (1991) (not yet reported), cited in Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 72.
212. The Court used Article 86, the competition article dealing with abuse of a dominant
position. Id.; see EEC TREATY art. 86. The Italian government had granted a monopoly on
dock facilities, requiring all loading and unloading of ships to be done by an Italian company.
Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 72. The Italian company could only hire Italian nationals. Id.
Further, there was evidence of monopoly abuse: the company had claimed payments for services
not rendered, charged disproportionate prices and discriminated between customers. Gyselen,
supra note 181, at 1238 (discussing Merci). The company also refused to use modern technology,
which led to increased costs and delays. Id.; Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 72.
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mented by evidence. 213 The Court also held that the undertaking had
violated the free import article, as imports were more expensive due
to the monopoly's abuse.21 4 The Court then examined Italy's role in
the undertaking's abuse of the Treaty rules. The Court concluded that
Italy had violated Article 90(1) by granting the monopoly which led
the undertaking to violate the free circulation and competition
articles.2
15
In Merci, the Court had evidence of actual discrimination and
abuse by the undertaking.216 However, in ERT217 and RTT218 only
the possibility of abuse and discrimination existed through the exer-
cise of the right.219 Although in Merci the undertaking's conduct in-
fringed its dominant position, 220 it did not follow that the grant of the
exclusive right caused the undertaking to abuse its position. The exist-
ence of the exclusive right might have been legitimate under the free
circulation rules if the undertaking had not abused its position.
In Merci, the Court utilized the automatic abuse test.22 1 However,
the Court should have utilized the two-step approach. The automatic
abuse test is only necessary when the free circulation rules cannot be
213. Gyselen, supra note 181, at 1238. Article 86 is the competition article prohibiting the
abuse of a dominant position. See EEC TREATY art. 86. For the evidence of monopoly abuse,
see supra note 212.
214. The free import article is Article 30. See EEC TREATY art. 30. Imported goods which
are unloaded inefficiently and at great cost make goods more expensive in relation to national
goods. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 74. The restriction on hiring only Italian workers
violated Article 48, the free movement of workers. ld. at 72. Article 48(1) provides: "Freedom
of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community by the end of the transitional
period at the latest." EEC TREATY art. 48(1).
215. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 74. The Court also held the monopoly did not provide
a service of general economic interest under the Article 90(2) exception. Id.
216. Gyselen, supra note 181, at 1238.
217. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text. I argued that the Court could have
relied on the free circulation rules to eliminate the exclusive rights under the theory that the
rights provided the possibility of discrimination. Id.
218. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
219. In both cases, the form of the right granted by the Member State led to the problem
with the undertaking's exercise of the right. In ERT, the State approved the undertaking's dis-
crimination through the form of the right granted. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
The right to transmit and retransmit broadcasts from other States gave the undertaking the op-
portunity to discriminate against broadcasts from other Member States. Id. In RTT, the State
also gave its approval to the undertaking to discriminate by the form of the right granted. See
supra note 181 and accompanying text. The right to draw up technical standards, and then deter-
mine if the competitor's equipment meets the standards, encouraged and gave the undertaking
the opportunity to discriminate. Id. However, I would argue the form of the rights granted in
Merci did not encourage or provide opportunities to discriminate or abuse a dominant position.
The undertaking abused its position on its own without approval or encouragement by the Mem-
ber State in the form of the right granted. Gyselen, supra note 181, at 1239-40.
220. Id. at 1238.
221. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 74.
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utilized,222 as the facts are only national.223 In Merci, the facts were
not national, as the monopoly's practices affected other Member
States. Thus, the free circulation rules could be utilized. Under the
two-step approach, the first step would involve determining whether
the grant of the right was justified under the free circulation rules.
There are several free movement articles the Court could have relied
on to eliminate the exclusive rights.224 Thus, the Court could have
held that the existence of the rights violated the free circulation rules,
eliminating the need to use Article 90(1).
D. The Court's Recent Return to the Two-Step Approach
More recently, the Commission has begun to attack exclusive
rights in the energy sector.225 The Commission argues that the exclu-
sive import/export rights violate the free circulation rules.226 Thus,
222. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
224. Besides Articles 30 and 48(2) (the free movement articles), Article 37 could also have
been utilized against the undertaking. For text of Article 30, see supra note 41. Article 48(2)
provides that "[s]uch freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based
on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and
other conditions of work and employment." EEC TREATY art. 48(2).
Article 37 could have been utilized as discrimination existed between the imported goods
and national goods due to the higher prices caused by the monopoly's abuses. See Van der
Woude, supra note 17, at 74; EEC TREATY art. 37. The Court could also have relied on Articles
59 and 52, the free circulation articles, to eliminate the exclusive rights. Van der Woude, supra
note 17, at 72-73. Van der Woude believes Article 59 was the better provision for the Court to
utilize, as the monopoly made it impossible for ships from other Member States to provide their
own services. Id.; EEC TREATY art. 59.
Article 52 was also violated as companies from other Member States could not establish
themselves in that port. Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 73-74. Article 52 provides:
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State
shall be abolished by progressive stages in the course of the transitional period. Such
progressive abolition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting up of agencies,
branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory
of any Member State. Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and
pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in
particular companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article
58, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where
such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to
capital.
EEC TREATY art. 52.
225. EC Delays Legal Action Over Import/Export Monopolies, supra note 28.
226. Id. Enforcement proceedings under Article 169 and reasoned opinions were brought by
the Commission against several Member States. Id. The reasoned opinions were issued in 1992.
Id. The Commission also announced that it would bring the case to the Court against France,
Italy, the Netherlands, Ireland and Spain in the electricity sector. Id. Proceedings will also be
brought against France and Denmark in the gas sector. Id. However, the Commission delayed
taking action after France and the Netherlands stated they were willing to review their legisla-
tion. Id. The free circulation rules that the Commission claimed were violated are Articles 30,
34, and 37. Article 34(1) provides: "Quantitative restrictions on exports, and all measures having
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the Commission is following the two-step approach by first analyzing
the exclusive rights under the free circulation articles alone.227 If the
rights violate the free circulation rules, the Commission should insti-
gate infringement proceedings against the Member States.228 If the
existence of the rights is legitimate, the Commission should then ana-
lyze the undertaking's exercise of the rights.
229
The energy sector's importance in the economy might justify an
Article 90(2) exemption or at least special treatment.230 However, the
Commission has been unwilling to grant Article 90(2) exceptions
based only on public service obligations.23 ' The Commission has em-
phasized that under the exception, the development of trade must not
be affected to an extent contrary to the Community's interests.
232
Thus, even if the rules' application obstructs the undertaking's per-
formance of its task, the rules must be applied to ensure that trade is
not affected contrary to the Community's interests.
In the postal services sector, the Court has ruled that even though
the Article 90(2) exception applies, it might not cover all services pro-
vided.233 In Belgium, an undertaking was granted an exclusive right
for postal services throughout the State.234 Criminal proceedings were
brought against a private individual who had provided certain postal
services. 235 The Court held that the exclusive right to perform serv-
ices of general economic interest was justified under Article 90(2).236
If private companies could enter the market, they could concentrate
on profitable services. The private companies would ignore the un-
profitable services which the public undertaking was required to pro-
equivalent effect, shall be prohibited between Member States." EEC TREATY art. 34(1). Article
30 prohibits restrictions on imports, and Article 37 provides for the free movement of services.
Id. arts. 30 and 37.
227. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 70, 226 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
230. The "Obscure Clarity" of Article 90, supra note 28. The new Energy Commissioner,
Abel Matutes, suggests asking the Court: (1) does energy supply involve a public service ex-
cluded under Article 90(2); or (2) is energy supply subject to the Treaty rules but with special
aspects? Id.
231. EC Delays Legal Action Over Import/Export Monopolies, supra note 28.
232. The "Obscure Clarity" of Article 90, supra note 28.
233. Postal Service Monopoly Cannot Be Justified, supra note 29, at 21. In May 1992, the
Commission adopted a green paper advocating limitations on exclusive rights in the postal sec-
tor. Ehlermann, supra note 24, at 68.
234. Postal Service Monopoly Cannot Be Justified, supra note 29, at 21. The exclusive rights
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vide.237 Thus, due to the competition, the public undertaking could
not offset the costs of the unprofitable services. 238
However, the Court held that certain services could be provided
by the private individual, as they could be separated from the services
of general economic interest.239 If the economic equilibrium of the
public undertaking's performance of general interest services was not
upset, the private undertaking could provide the services. 240 Thus, the
State had violated Article 90(1) by granting the undertaking an exclu-
sive right over services, some of which were unjustifiably excluded
from competition.241
III. THE SOLUTION: ELIMINATING THE COMMISSION'S ABUSES
WHILE FURTHERING THE COMMUNITY'S FREE MARKET
COMPETITION GOAL
In the future, the Commission will continue its campaign to liber-
alize the Member States' economies in the name of free market com-
petition. Many sectors traditionally dominated by monopolies and
public undertakings will come under the Commission's attack. Fur-
ther, the privatization of companies, like utilities, will still be subject
to Article 90 if they continue to enjoy special or exclusive rights.242
To reach a workable solution, the Commission and the Member
States must both compromise their goals. The Commission will have
to follow the established Treaty rules for dealing with monopolies,
weakening its enormous Article 90(3) power. In return, the Member
States must cooperate with the Commission when the Commission
carries out its duty of regulating the Member States' monopolies.
When the Commission follows the established framework and does
not rely on Article 90(3), the States should have no excuse for not
cooperating.
A. The Two-Step Approach: Retaining the Distinction Between the
"Existence" and the "Exercise" of Monopoly Rights
To relinquish its Article 90(3) power, the Commission should fol-
low the two-step approach in analyzing the existence and exercise of
237. Id.
238. Id. The services provided by the private individual required additional services which
the postal service monopoly did not offer. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. The private companies could then satisfy the demand for those services. Id.
241. Id.
242. Hancher & Slot, supra note 78, at 36.
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exclusive rights granted by Member States. Further, the Court of Jus-
tice should uphold this approach. The Commission should issue deci-
sions under Article 90(3) only when using the automatic abuse test.
This test is utilized only when the exclusive rights may not be elimi-
nated through the free circulation rules. Further, directives should
only be utilized under Article 90(3) to give the States guidance on
how to comply with the Treaty rules. Directives should not be used as
a legislative measure.
Under the two-step approach, the rights are first examined under
the free circulation rules.243 Exclusive rights are justified only if there
is a non-economic public interest reason for their existence.244 These
reasons include mandatory requirements and exceptions to the free
circulation rules.245 If the Commission determines the free circulation
rules are violated by the granting of the powers, they will begin in-
fringement proceedings against the State.246
Under an infringement proceeding, the State and the undertaking
have the benefit of procedural safeguards.247 The Commission must
inform the State of the problem and give the State an opportunity to
be heard.2 48 The undertaking should also have this opportunity, as it
is also being affected. The State and/or the undertaking can then give
a justification for the exclusive rights or claim an Article 90(2) excep-
tion. For example, in the postal services sector, the undertaking
showed that without the exclusive right it could not operate effi-
ciently.249 The State also has the opportunity to clarify what the con-
ferred grant of rights actually includes.
Further, the State can show that, while the granting of the right
was legitimate, the undertaking's exercise of the right is in violation of
the Treaty. An example of this occurred in Merci where the undertak-
ing was abusing its monopoly position. However, the Member State's
granting of the right by itself might not have violated the free circula-
tion rules.25 0
243. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 219-20. Although the grant of the exclusive rights did violate the free
circulation rules, the Court used the automatic abuse test to eliminate the rights. The Court
should have eliminated the rights under the free circulation articles alone. In some cases, the
grant of the rights might not infringe the free circulation rules. See supra notes 213-24 and
accompanying text.
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After taking into account the State's and undertaking's views, the
Commission can issue a reasoned opinion to the State. The opinion
must state the reasons for the Commission's actions.251 If the State
does not comply with the opinion by the deadline, the Commission
can then bring the case before the Court of Justice.252 Thus, due to
the procedural safeguards, the two-step approach limits the Commis-
sion's power as compared to the use of Article 90(3).
When the Commission utilizes Article 90(3) instead of the twe-
step approach, Member States and undertakings are deprived of the
above mentioned procedural safeguards. Under the Article 90(3) ap-
proach used in Telecommunications Terminals,253 the Commission can
issue a directive to the Member State calling for the elimination of the
exclusive rights.254 The Commission can also issue a decision to the
Member State.255 The State must follow the directive or decision or
apply for its annulment.256 If the decision or directive is not annulled
and the State chooses to ignore it, the Commission can bring the State
before the Court through an infringement proceeding. 257 The proce-
dure is then the same as discussed above under the two-step approach.
However, the Article 90(3) procedure can lead to abuse if Mem-
ber States comply with the Commission's directive or decision. The
Commission is not constrained by procedural safeguards, which are
present in infringement proceedings.258 The Commission has a vast
amount of power to issue directives to Member States eliminating ex-
clusive rights. The Commission is not required to inform the State of
the violation and then allow the State the right to be heard. 259 Fur-
ther, when the Commission enacts a directive, the Member State does
not have a voice in the process.26° The State's only source of input is
its Commission appointee. However, the appointee is required to act
independently of the State.261 Also, the appointee must vote to enact
251. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
253. 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1240.
254. EEC TREATY art. 90(3).
255. Id.
256. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. The undertaking may also challenge the
directive. Id.
257. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text. Infringement proceedings are brought
under Article 169. See EEC TREATY art. 169.
259. See supra notes 137-38. This also applies to the undertaking which was granted the
exclusive right or monopoly.
260. See infra text accompanying note 138.
261. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
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directives that further the Community's goals, not merely the State's
goals.
Another procedural safeguard lacking under an Article 90(3) de-
cision or directive is a statement of the Commission's reasons for its
actions. Under Article 90(3), the Commission has to give some basis
for its directive. However, the basis is not required to be as extensive
as the reasons required for the infringement of a free circulation rule
under Article 169.262 The Court has held that under Article 90(3) the
Commission can define the Member States' obligations, which must
be met for compliance with Article 90.263 Defining obligations only
requires setting out commands and prohibited actions. This is not as
extensive as stating reasons for the finding of an infringement. Fur-
ther, under an infringement proceeding, if the State feels that the
statement of reasons is inadequate it can appeal the decision to the
Court.264 The Court will then have to review the statement of rea-
sons. However, the mere defining of obligations leaves little sub-
stance for the Court to review.
The two-step approach is also advantageous because it furthers
the Community's free competition goal.265 Under this approach, the
free circulation articles are first applied to the Member State's grant-
ing of the rights.266 Then, the competition rules are applied to the
exercise of the rights.267 The Treaty founders set forth these two sets
of rules as protections, to ensure the upholding of the free competi-
tion goal.268 When Article 90(3) is used in place of the two-step ap-
proach, the Commission enacts a directive eliminating exclusive rights
in a particular sector. This method lacks the two-part analysis dis-
cussed above. Thus, the Commission uses its own method to uphold
the free competition goal, Article 90(3), instead of following the two
sets of Treaty rules. The Commission prefers Article 90(3) because
the Article enables it to assume a legislative role, as discussed below.
Under Article 90(3), the Commission can exceed its regulatory
role by legislating.269 This can occur when the Commission issues di-
rectives under Article 90(3). Through these directives, the Commis-
sion can eliminate exclusive rights that it believes will violate the
262. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
263. Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1264.
264. See supra note 140 and accompanying text; see also EEC TREATY art. 169.
265. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
269. See infra text accompanying note 148.
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Treaty.270 Instead of applying the free circulation rules and finding an
infringement (a regulatory role), the Commission is making law by
utilizing Article 90(3). Through Article 90(3) the Commission can
make policy choices. It can decide in which sectors exclusive rights
must be eliminated in the name of the free market competition
goal.2 71 However, the Commission's role as defined in Article 90 is a
regulatory role.272 Article 90(3) gives the Commission the authority
to adopt only necessary measures to ensure that Member States com-
ply with the Article.273 The measures under Article 90(3) are not nec-
essary, as the free circulation rules can be utilized to eliminate the
exclusive rights.
An example of this legislative role occurred in Telecommunica-
tions Terminals.274 The Commission used a directive to bring an en-
forcement proceeding against States which were not in compliance
with Article 90.275 However, enforcement proceedings against Mem-
ber States must be brought under the infringement proceeding article
with the attendant procedural safeguards. 276 Thus, the Commission
abused its regulatory authority by misusing the Article 90(3) directive
procedure. 277 Therefore, the Commission should not issue directives
in place of infringement proceedings. When issuing directives under
Article 90(3), the Commission should define only the obligations of
the States in order to give them direction for compliance with the Ar-
ticle. This is consistent with the Court's definition of the Commis-
sion's power under Article 90(3) discussed in Telecommunications
Terminals.
278
270. See, e.g., Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1223.
271. See supra note 115, noting that the Advocate General in Telecommunications Terminals
argues that the Commission took a legislative role not within its competence when it issued the
directive. The directive also was not necessary for the Commission's performance of its duties
under Article 90, as an infringement proceeding under the free circulation rules could have been
brought to eliminate the exclusive rights.
272. Id. art. 90(3).
273. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
274. 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1234.
275. Id. The Commission even admitted this was the purpose of the directive. Id. However,
the Court could have eliminated the exclusive rights through the free circulation rules and an
infringement proceeding. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
276. Infringement proceedings are brought under Article 169. See EEC TREATY art. 169.
For the procedural safeguards, see supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
277. Telecommunications Terminals, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1264. The Court held Article 90 could
not be used in place of Article 169 for infringement proceedings. Id. However, the Court held
that the Directive merely set out the Member States' obligations under Article 90. Id. The
Court ignored the fact that the Commission stated that the Directive was a means of correcting
present infringements and preventing future ones. Id. at 1-1234.
278. Id. at 1-1264. This is consistent with the Court's definition, although the Court chose to
ignore the Commission's stated reason for the Directive, which was to correct present infringe-
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Further, the Member States lack the power to curtail the Com-
mission's adoption of a regulatory role. Although the States can elect
new Commission members, the members are admonished to act inde-
pendently of their States 279 and must take the entire Community's
needs into account when acting. Thus, in the name of the Community,
the Commission might have an incentive to abuse its power in order
to bring about further liberalization. The Commission's incentive is
also strengthened by political bargaining in the Council of Ministers.
This bargaining retards the legislative process and waters down the
legislation.280 For these reasons, the Commission's incentive to regu-
late must be checked. Thus, under Article 90(3) the Commission
should only have the power to issue directives to define States' obliga-
tions under Article 90. The States will then have notice about how to
comply with the Article and the Commission will not overstep its reg-
ulatory role.
The Commission and the Court should only resort to Article
90(3) decisions when they cannot regulate the existence of exclusive
rights under the free circulation rules. This is the automatic abuse
test. The Commission should limit its Article 90(3) decisions in this
situation because it is assuming a legislative role. By deciding a case,
the Commission determines what constitutes an infringement of Arti-
cle 90(1). However, if the existence of the rights can be regulated
under the free circulation rules, an infringement proceeding281 should
be brought instead of an Article 90(3) decision.
If the free circulation rules cannot be utilized, the Commission
and the Court will have to issue an Article 90(3) decision because of
the Article 90(1) violation. In the Hofner case, this situation occurred.
The free circulation rules could not be applied to the existence of the
exclusive right because the case involved national facts. 28 2 Thus, the
only way to eliminate the existence of the exclusive right was through
an Article 90(3) decision, applying Article 90 with a competition
article.
ments and prevent future ones, and the Court upheld the use of Article 90 combined with the
free circulation rules. Id. at 1-1234, 1-1268.
279. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
280. Coleman, supra note 41, at 207. The author discusses how, when measures are decided
on in the Council, there is political bargaining between Member States, slowing down the liberal-
ization process. Id.
281. EEC TREATY art. 169.
282. H45fner, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2020. The free movement articles apply only when trade is
affected between the Member States, not when activities occur within a single Member State.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 69:1025
PUBLIC MONOPOLIES IN THE EEC
However, the automatic abuse test should only be utilized when
the free circulation articles alone cannot eliminate the existence of
exclusive rights. In Hofner the Court used the automatic abuse test,
as the free circulation rules were inappropriate.283 The automatic
abuse test was also used in the ERT and RTT cases, although there
were violations under the free circulation articles. 2 4 The automatic
abuse test should not have been utilized, as the rights could have been
eliminated by the free circulation violation alone.
If Article 90(1) could not be utilized in the automatic abuse situa-
tion, the Article would have no meaning or effect. 285 Article 90(1) ap-
plies only to measures enacted by Member States, not to actions taken
by public undertakings. 286 As the exercise of the rights resides with
the public undertakings and they cannot be regulated under Article
90, the Article must regulate more than the mere exercise of the
rights. Further, if the existence alone of exclusive rights cannot be
regulated under Article 90(1), the automatic abuse approach is the
only way this article can be applied. Under this approach, Article
90(1) applies to Member States. It also applies to the existence of the
exclusive rights only when the free circulation rules cannot be utilized
and the exercise of the rights will infringe the Treaty.
If the undertaking's exercise of the rights violates the Treaty and
the grant of the rights did not lead to this abuse, the competition and
free circulation rules should be applied to the undertaking. Article 90
should not be utilized, as the Member States' grant of the right does
not violate the Treaty. This is what occurred in Merci.287 The Court
should not have utilized Article 90(1) since the granting of the exclu-
sive right did not require the undertaking to abuse its dominant posi-
283. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
284. In both ERT and RTT, the exclusive rights could have been held to violate the free
movement articles alone. See infra notes 163-97 and accompanying text. Thus, Article 90 in
conjunction with a competition article was not needed. The free circulation rules would be more
appropriate as the Court did not have evidence of discrimination by the public undertaking.
Under the free circulation rules, only a possibility of discrimination affecting trade between
States must be shown. See Van der Woude, supra note 17, at 75. The author discusses how the
free circulation rules approach would not entail the burdens of market analysis required under
Article 86. Id.; see also EEC TREATY arts. 30, 37, 59. However, under the competition rules, the
undertakings' practices must be shown to negatively affect competition. Van der Woude, supra
note 17, at 75; see EEC TREATY arts. 85, 86.
285. The automatic abuse test is used when the free circulation articles cannot be used to
analyze exclusive rights. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
286. See EEC TREATY art. 90(1); see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 213-24, 250 and accompanying text.
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tion. The Court should have used the free circulation rules to strike
down the existence of the exclusive right.288
Thus, for all the above mentioned reasons, the Commission and
the Court should use the two-step approach for analyzing the exist-
ence and exercise of exclusive rights. First, the existence of the rights
should be analyzed under the free circulation rules alone, instead of
merging them with Article 90.289 However, decisions can be issued
under Article 90(3) under the automatic abuse test, although the auto-
matic abuse test should only be utilized when the exclusive rights can-
not be eliminated under the free circulation articles.
The second step involves analyzing the undertaking's exercise of
the rights under the Treaty.290 Again, Article 90 is not involved, as
Article 90(1) applies to measures enacted by Member States. 291 Fur-
ther, directives under Article 90(3) should only be issued to clarify
States' Treaty obligations in relation with their undertakings. 292
In applying the Article 90(2) exception, the Commission and the
Court should not follow the approach used for exceptions under the
free circulation rules. In RTT, the Court gave the same justifications
for the Article 90(2) exception as it earlier gave for exceptions under
the free circulation rules.293 Thus, if exclusive rights survive the first
step of the test, the rights must qualify under the Article 90(2) excep-
tion.294 Then all undertakings granted exclusive rights would be ex-
empted from the Treaty rules in the exercise of their rights because of
the exception.
The Court should establish a different standard for applying the
Article 90(2) exception. The standard should allow national courts
and the Court to determine first whether an undertaking is providing
a service in the general interest. Then the courts can determine if the
undertaking will be unable to provide the service if compliance with
the Treaty is required. The determination must also consider if the
exception will affect the development of Community trade.295
288. See supra notes 221-24, 250 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
291. See EEC TREATY art. 90; see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 269-78 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
295. EEC TREATY art. 90(2). Article 90(2) provides in the last sentence: "The development
of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the
Community." Id.; see also supra note 232. The Commission gave great weight to this factor in
deciding if the Article 90(2) exception applied to the energy sector. See supra note 232 and
accompanying text.
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Further, the Article 90(2) exception might not apply to all the
services provided under the exclusive right.296 The Commission and
the Court should determine if all services are justified under the ex-
ception. If services can be operated by private undertakings without
disturbing the monopoly's operations, then those services should not
be granted exclusive rights. The sectors which must be operated as
monopolies will remain, but more services will become open to pri-
vate undertakings and competition.
The Court should also provide a more systematic way for an un-
dertaking to apply for an Article 90(2) exception. At present, an un-
dertaking can obtain an exemption if its national government requests
a Commission decision under Article 90(3).297 Otherwise, the under-
taking must seek a declaration in national court.298 Under the first
approach, the undertaking must rely on its national government to
request a decision. Under the second approach, the possibility exists
that the Commission will overrule the exemption. 299 Thus, this second
option does not provide the undertaking with legal certainty.3° ° The
Commission should adopt a system that allows the undertaking to ap-
ply directly to the Commission, after which the Commission would
issue a decision, before the undertaking engages in the activity, on
whether the exception applies. 301
B. The Explanation for the Court's Failure
to Adopt the Two-Step Approach
The Court has failed to adopt the two-step solution because of
political factors. The Court allows the Commission a broad legislative
power under Article 90 because it supports the Commission's liberali-
zation goal. The Court agrees with the Commission's reasoning that
monopolies must be eliminated to further the Community's free mar-
ket competition goal. Further, the Court does not want to hinder the
Commission's campaign and thus allows the Commission to assume a
legislative role beyond its authority.
Furthermore, if the Court curtails the Commission's authority
under Article 90, the liberalization process will be left to the Council
of Ministers. Legislative measures are subject to political bargaining
296. See, e.g., supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
297. Hancher & Slot, supra note 78, at 39.
298. Id. This option was made available after ERT, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-2962.
299. Hancher & Slot, supra note 78, at 38.




in the Council 302 and legislation loses its effectiveness through com-
promise. Therefore, the exclusive rights will not be as quickly and
effectively eliminated if the process is left to the Council.
The use of Article 90 offers a swift and simple solution, in con-
trast to an infringement procedure under the free circulation arti-
cles.30 3 Article 90(3) directives and decisions can be directly applied
to the States and undertakings without the procedural safeguards of
an infringement procedure. 3°4 Procedural safeguards retard the liber-
alization process and can effectively curtail it if the safeguards are not
followed.
Although Article 90 offers a quick and simple solution to exclu-
sive rights, the Court should not allow the Commission to abuse Arti-
cle 90 by assuming a legislative role. The European Economic
Community was formed with a division of power and duties between
the institutions.30 5 However, if the Court allows the Commission to
enact legislation, which is a Council duty,3°6 the balance between the
different institutions will be upset. Further, each institution has differ-
ent requirements and procedures that must be followed based on its
duties in the Community. 30 7 These procedures ensure that the institu-
tion's power will not be abused. However, as the Commission does
not have the requirements and procedures required of an institution
with a legislative role, it should not assume this role under Article
90.308
Due to its legislative power, the Council's organization and pro-
cedures differ from the Commission's. 3°9 The Council's duties include
ensuring coordination of the general economic policies of the Member
States, enacting decisions to ensure the Treaty objectives are obtained,
and adopting acts.310 The Council is composed of ministers from each
Member State, usually the Minister of Foreign Affairs.31' The mem-
bers' voting power is controlled by a democratic system, as it is depen-
302. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
303. See infra text accompanying notes 136-47.
304. Id.
305. Articles 137-44 govern the European Parliament; Articles 145-54 govern the Council;
Articles 155-63 govern the Commission; Articles 164-88 govern the Court of Justice. EEC
TREATY arts. 137-88.
306. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 305.
308. Id.
309. EEC TREATY arts. 145-63.
310. Id. art. 145.
311. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 3, at 51. If a meeting involves a special subject, like agri-
culture, those relevant ministers will compose the Council. Id.
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dent on the relative population size of the State.312 Although
qualified majority voting is usually required, 313 unanimous voting is
required for some measures.314 A simple majority vote is rare.315 This
voting system serves as a safeguard ensuring that all or most Member
States agree with the legislation. Council members are also author-
ized to bind their governments.31 6 Thus, the members are represent-
ing their States and will take their States' views into account when
voting. This organization and these procedures ensure that the legi-s-
lative process is a democratic one and that every Member State has a
voice in the process.
In contrast, the Commission has a different organization and dif-
ferent procedures based on its duties.317 The Commission's duties in-
clude ensuring compliance with Treaty law and initiating legislation.
318
312. Id.
313. Id. Article 148 of the Treaty explains the qualified majority voting procedure. See EEC
TREATY art. 148. Article 148 provides:
1. Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Council shall act by a majority of
its members.
2. Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority, the votes of its













For their adoption, acts of the Council shall require at least:
-54 votes in favour where this Treaty requires them to be adopted on a proposal
from the Commission,
-54 votes in favour, cast by at least 8 members, in other cases.
3. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the
adoption by the Council of acts which require unanimity.
Id.
Each state's votes are given a different weight depending on its size. See id. When the
Treaty requires the Council to adopt acts on a proposal from the Commission, 54 votes in favor
are needed. See id. In other cases, 54 votes in favor must be cast by at least eight members. Id.
All of a State's votes must be cast as a bloc. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 3, at 53. Id. The
purpose of the 54 rule is to prevent the large or small states as a group from controlling the
defeat or passage of acts. Id. The 54 rule allows three large states to defeat an act, but requires
the vote of two small states to pass an act. Id.
314. Id. at 52. Unanimity is required for accession of new members or the harmonization of
tax legislation. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 51.
317. See EEC TREATY arts. 155-63.
318. Article 155 provides:
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Commission members are appointed by their Member State govern-
ments, and are not required to be ministers. 319 Further, voting power
is disbursed through one vote for the smaller States and two votes for
the five larger States.320 This is in contrast to the Council's voting
power, which is based on population size.321 Instead of unanimity or
qualified majority voting, a simple majority is required.
322
Commission members are also required to act independently of
their Member States.323 The members must act in furtherance of the
Community and not just their respective States. Thus, the Commis-
sion does not represent its Member States when carrying out its du-
ties. The Commission's organization and procedures are not as
democratic and representative of the Member States as are the Coun-
cil's organization and procedures. Therefore, the Commission should
not be allowed to enact legislation under Article 90.
CONCLUSION
If the two-step approach combined with the automatic abuse test
is utilized by the Court and the Commission, the Community's goal of
free market competition will be furthered. The Member States and
undertakings will offer less resistance to liberalization for several rea-
sons. First, the States and undertakings will have opportunities to
present their views through the procedural safeguards contained in
infringement proceedings. Directives issued under Article 90(3) will
provide Member States with notice on how to comply with the Treaty.
Also, these directives will no longer be utilized as legislative measures,
which is an abuse of the Commission's power. Further, compliance by
Member States will occur if the Article 90(2) exception is clarified.
Undertakings will also be able to apply for the exception directly to
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the common market, the
Commission shall:
-ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the institu-
tions pursuant thereto are applied;
-formulate recommendations or deliver opinions on matters dealt with in this
Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers it necessary;
-have its own power of decision and participate in the shaping of measures taken
by the Council and by the European Parliament in the manner provided for in this
Treaty;
-exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of the
rules laid down by the latter.
Id. art. 155.




323. Id. at 57 n.2.
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the Commission. By following the two-step approach, the Community
can further its free competition goal and the Member States can pur-
sue their individual economic policies, all within the established
Treaty framework.

